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Steven G. Calabresi* 
It is a great pleasure to bring this wonderful Symposium issue to a 
close, and I want to begin by thanking Dean Michael Fitts, the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Law School, the University of Pennsylvania Jour-
nal of Constitutional Law, and most of all my wonderful co-author, 
Christopher Yoo, for all of the hard work that was necessary to cause 
this issue and the conference that preceded it to happen.  I also 
would like to thank each one of the Symposium participants for their 
essays.  I have learned a lot from reading them, and I will keep what I 
have learned in mind for yet another book on the unitary executive, 
which I am in the process of writing.  Thanks to all who came to Phil-
adelphia in the middle of the cold winter of 2009 to share ideas about 
the presidency. 
We are slightly more than a year into the Obama presidency as I 
write and so the question of the constitutional powers of the presi-
dency over a bureaucracy staffed for eight years by George W. Bush is 
of more than passing interest.  President Obama did not inherit the 
whole George W. Bush cabinet, and, if he had, I think we would all 
agree he would be crippled today.  But, President Obama did inherit 
a lot of subordinate officials in the bureaucracy appointed by Repub-
licans since 2001.  Although the presidential election of 2008 was in 
significant part a dispute about the future of economic policy and 
regulation of financial markets, President Obama must today work 
with Federal Reserve Board officials and Securities and Exchange 
Commission personnel that he inherited from President Bush.  I 
think President Obama can fire the Bush personnel he inherited and 
that he can supervise and control them.  This power could of course 
be abused, like any other presidential power, and the remedy for that 
is impeachment and defeat for re-election.  So far President Obama, 
like almost all of his forty-three predecessors, has shown no signs 
whatsoever that he will abuse the removal power or the powers of su-
pervision and control of subordinates. 
The first year of the Obama Administration provides a vivid ex-
ample of the way in which a unitary executive facilitates democratic 
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control over the bureaucracy.  The problem of how democratically to 
control large bureaucracies is one of the most vexing problems faced 
by modern government.  I think the unitary executive set up by our 
Constitution responds to that problem by allowing the voters to elect 
an administrator-in-chief every four years.  In his magnificent paper 
for this conference, my former Administrative Law teacher Jerry Ma-
shaw has pointed to other mechanisms of popular control of the bu-
reaucracy that have been available since the founding.1  He mentions 
mechanisms including:  (1) congressional control; (2) direct citizen 
involvement and participation; (3) decentralized administration; and 
(4) control through the political parties.  I want to mention several 
reasons why I think control of the bureaucracy through the President 
is on the whole better. 
First, the American people clearly believe today that the most im-
portant decision they get to make in this democracy is the selection 
of the President of the United States.2  Americans mobilize for presi-
dential elections in enormous numbers; the selection process plays 
out over an eighteen month period of time; and the candidates for 
the presidency and their policy views are subjected to microscopic in-
vestigation.  News coverage of presidential elections is incredibly 
comprehensive and thorough.  And, a whole lot more people vote in 
presidential elections than vote in mid-term or off year elections.  
Voter turnout in presidential years usually exceeds sixty percent while 
in mid-term elections it falls below forty percent.3  Voters act as if 
presidential elections are really important, as was illustrated in the 
Obama-McCain election through which we just lived.  Millions of 
Americans mobilized passionately in the presidential election of 
2008, and they all had in common the belief that it really mattered 
whether Obama or McCain won.  I think the theory of the unitary ex-
ecutive, a theory with a 220 year pedigree, offers a way of realizing the 
current belief of contemporary Americans that presidential elections 
are really important. 
The President has few enumerated powers in Article II, Section 2.  
There is the Commander-in-Chief power, the power to request opin-
ions; the pardon power, and then two powers—the appointment 
power and the treaty power—which the President shares with the Se-
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nate.4  Article II, Section 3 imposes a series of duties on the President 
like the duties to give a State of the Union Address, to receive ambas-
sadors, and to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.5  It would 
be impossible for the President to fulfill those duties or for that mat-
ter his oath to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the 
United States6 unless the Vesting Clause of Article II7 gave him the 
executive power and made him, in effect, our Administrator-in-Chief.  
The American people today act as if the President has that power.  
Hundreds of thousands of people would not attend rallies over an 
eighteen month period of time to select a person who receives am-
bassadors and requests opinion from the heads of departments! 
The importance of the presidential election and of the President’s 
mandate from winning it is only augmented by the fact that other fea-
tures of our Constitution act as a formidable check on the President.  
First, it is an iron law of politics that the party in power in the White 
House loses seats in Congress in mid-term elections.  President Rea-
gan lost control of the House of Representative in the 1982 mid-term 
elections, and President Clinton lost both Houses of Congress in 
1994.  Second, it is also noteworthy that thirty-nine of the fifty state 
governorships, including all the big and powerful ones, turn over ei-
ther in the mid-term election or in an off year election.  Only eleven 
governors races are held on the same day as the presidential election.  
The party out of power in the White House thus always picks up sev-
eral governorships because it usually wins mid-term or off year elec-
tions.8 
What this means is that the presidential election for which every-
one mobilizes and thinks is determinative usually selects someone 
who becomes a lightning rod, resulting in the empowerment of the 
President’s opponents.  In other words, win the presidency today, and 
in eight years, your party will have lost control of Congress and of a 
majority of the governorships, including all of the most powerful 
ones.  This process is already well under way for President Obama 
and the Democrats as they were swept out of the governors’ offices in 
November 2009 in New Jersey and Virginia.  Recognizing the Presi-
dent’s power to control and supervise the administration is a modest 
step toward rectifying the imbalance that exists between the popular 
perception of the President’s power and his actual constitutional 
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powers of office.  I am no fan of lawmaking by presidential decree, 
executive order, regulation, or proclamation, as I will explain further 
below, but I do think that recognizing the President’s administrator-
in-chief status is both constitutionally valid and brings the actual 
powers of the presidency more nearly in line with public expecta-
tions. 
Second, a main democratic alternative to presidential control of 
the bureaucracy is congressional control.  Representatives and Sena-
tors are elected so why not let them control the bureaucracy just as 
they are the ones in which the Constitution vests the lawmaking pow-
er?  The problem with a congressional government of this kind is that 
Congress controls the bureaucracy primarily through its committees.9  
Membership on the committees is to some extent a function of self 
selection since new members express preferences as to what commit-
tees they want a seat on.  Farm state senators thus select to be on the 
Agriculture committees, while the representatives of Wall Street opt 
for the Finance Committee.  Once on a committee, individuals move 
up through the seniority system.  Since re-election rates for members 
of Congress are comparable to those in the former Soviet Union, it is 
not impossible for a Senator to serve on an oversight committee for 
fifty years as Robert Byrd has done and as Ted Kennedy came close to 
doing. 
Committee governance of the bureaucracy is problematic because 
it is cheaper to capture a Congressman or a Senator than it is to cap-
ture the President.  House and Senate elections are very inexpensive 
and are easily influenced, as compared to presidential elections.  
Moreover, the members of the committees already will have selected 
themselves with the interests of their district and states in mind.  Al-
truism does not guide farm state members of Congress toward the 
Agriculture Committees. 
My colleague Jide Nzelibe has argued that the median member of 
Congress as a whole is closer to the mean of national public opin-
ion.10  But, even if that were true, it is not the median member of 
Congress as a whole that tries to supervise and control the bureauc-
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L. REV. 1696, 1703–04 (2009) (asserting that congressional committees are easily cap-
tured and that is a bad thing). 
 10 Jide Nzelibe, The Fable of the Nationalist President and the Parochial Congress, 53 UCLA L. REV. 
1217, 1221 (2006). 
Feb. 2010] CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 655 
 
racy.  It is the committee chairs and their staffs that do that, and they 
are easily captured. 
Presidential control of the bureaucracy is essential to stop the cap-
tured congressional committees from steering national law execution 
in ways that benefit their districts and states.  Imagine for a moment 
that you are a bureaucrat and you face conflicting commands from 
the President who is here and gone in eight years and a Senator who 
has already served for thirty years and is set to go twenty more?  Who 
would you expect the bureaucracy to listen to?  The doctrine of the 
unitary executive is vital if the President is to have even a fighting 
chance against committee control of the government.  The congres-
sional committees are the stunted growth of a parliamentary system 
of government, and the only reason they cannot take over the Cabi-
net Departments is because the Incompatibility Clause prevents 
members of Congress from holding executive or judicial offices.11  If 
we take away presidential power to supervise and to control the bu-
reaucracy, we will find the parochial congressional committees exer-
cising that power instead. 
Is there a way to reform the congressional committees so they are 
not so dysfunctional?  Yes.  I do not favor term limits for Representa-
tives or Senators any longer, but I do favor them for membership on 
a congressional committee.12  That would bring opinion on the com-
mittees more nearly in line with the opinion of the median member 
of Congress.  We also might consider requiring that all communica-
tions between congressional committee members and their staffs and 
the bureaucracy be public and on the record.  We all were shocked to 
discover two years ago that two former members of the New Mexico 
delegation had privately lobbied the Bush Administration to hire a 
more partisan U.S. Attorney for New Mexico.  Conversations between 
the congressional committees and the agencies for which they are re-
sponsible should be public and on the record.  There was a lot of 
sometimes justified complaining about the Bush Administration’s ex-
cessive secrecy, but there is a secrecy problem with the committees 
and the bureaucracy as well.  Jerry Mashaw talks about the impor-
tance of publicity as a means of providing popular control of the bu-
reaucracy, and I agree with him wholeheartedly on that.  Let’s shine a 
spotlight on conversations between the bureaucracy and the Hill. 
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Third, Jerry points out many mechanisms of popular control of 
the administration in the antebellum years.  He is, of course, abso-
lutely right about that, and I certainly do not think the unitary execu-
tive is the only vehicle for providing popular control of law admini-
stration.  The widespread use of civil juries in the antebellum years 
and the absence until circa 1840 of official immunity doctrines shield-
ing government officials from lawsuits and were major checks on ad-
ministrative power.13  John Quincy Adams’s report of Massachusetts 
opposition to Jefferson’s embargo as manifesting itself in a judge try-
ing upward of forty cases and not getting a single conviction is strik-
ing.14 
I am troubled for both policy and constitutional reasons by our 
unwillingness to make greater use of civil juries in administrative law 
cases15 and by the unreasonably broad official immunity doctrines, 
made up by the federal courts out of whole cloth.  I do not know 
what, if anything, should be done to make greater use of civil juries or 
to cut back on official immunity, but I am certainly open to consider-
ing such ideas.  The fact that there were such mechanisms of popular 
control in the antebellum years and that those very mechanisms have 
lapsed in our era is, I think, a reason to be even more vigilant about 
maintaining the popular check that the unitary executive provides. 
A fourth popular check on the administration that I would favor is 
to rein in broad legislative delegations of power.  Here I must re-
spectfully disagree with Jerry Mashaw, who made the definitive best 
case in favor of broad delegation in one of the most famous adminis-
trative law articles of the last half century.16  I think Congress often 
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aggrandizes power to itself when it delegates power because it often 
delegates the power to an executive entity that Congress’s own over-
sight committee can control.  Where that happens, the Montesquiean 
separation of legislative and executive power is breached.  The more 
independent the entity in question is made of the President, the 
more likely it will be that the congressional committees with control 
over the purse and ability to hold career ending hearings will acquire 
power and control.  The best ways to rein in broad congressional del-
egations of power are, first, to make all such delegations sunset after a 
term of years and, second, to require that when Congress does dele-
gate it does so to an entity that Congress knows is controlled by Con-
gress’s institutional rival, the President. 
It is for this reason that Justice Rehnquist argued that the Su-
preme Court was wrong in INS v. Chadha17 to uphold the delegation 
in that case of the power to stay deportations along with the legisla-
tive veto, which the Supreme Court quite rightly found unconstitu-
tional.18  Rehnquist thought it was almost inconceivable that the Con-
gress that passed the Act under review in Chadha, with so broad a 
delegation, would have done so if Congress had known that its legis-
lative veto check on the power it was delegating would be held by the 
courts to be unconstitutional.19  Rehnquist’s argument in Chadha was 
wrong because it allowed his guess as to congressional intent to 
trump the plain language of the sweeping severability clause that was 
at issue in the case.  It may well be that the non-delegation doctrine is 
not judicially enforceable, but it would be nice if the federal courts 
could at least make Congress reconsider statute by statute whether it 
wants to delegate particular powers knowing that it cannot retain 
control through the legislative veto.  Whether it can do that or not 
depends, however, on the language of the Severability Clause that is 
in question.  I do not favor giving the President by statute a kind of 
plebiscitary lawmaking power, and I do think forcing Congress to po-
lice itself better on delegations would thus be a good idea.  Knowing 
that all delegated power will be controlled by Congress’s institutional 
rival—the President—and not by the oversight committees would 
cause Congress to delegate with more restraint. 
A fifth and final popular check on administrative power comes 
from departmentalism itself—the idea that all three branches of the 
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national government play a role in constitutional enforcement.  Pres-
idents do get some strange ideas about presidential power from time 
to time, and it is vital that Congress and the courts push back to the 
extent they can when that happens.  Thanks fortunately to the two-
term limit there is a real constraint on how much damage a President 
can do.  We ought not to favor judicial supremacy in constitutional 
interpretation any more than we favor presidential or congressional 
supremacy in constitutional interpretation.  Our refuge lies as Madi-
son said it would in The Federalist 51 in three-branch enforcement of 
constitutional rights.20  A lot of attention has been paid to judicial and 
congressional views on the removal power issue.  Chris Yoo and I 
hope we have redressed the balance a bit by looking at presidential 
views on the same subject. 
Thanks to all who have contributed to this issue for making this 
such a wonderful Symposium. 
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